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AN EVALUATION OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
T W G  IN QANTAS 
P. J. Moore, R. A Telfer, and R. L. Wilkinson 
This study reports an evaluation of a Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) training program at Qantas 
Airlines in Australia. Four sets of survey data were gathered: Two from crew involved in CRM and a specific 
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenario conducted in a simulator; and two from instructors, one from 
the LOFI' instructors, the other from the CRM instructors. The crew results showed that CRM was 
perceived to have improved teamwork and leadership and that LOFT was viewed favorably. The instructor 
results showed generally successful implementation of the decision-making strategies but indicated that certain 
groups were not sufficiently assertive in communicating their preferred options. The instructors were 
generally positive in their evaluation of the CRM program. Implications are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
After two years of research and development, CRM 
training was introduced by Qantas in May 1989. 
Management consultants (Coopers and Lybrand) were 
commissioned to aid the airline in designing the course. 
A committee drawn from the aircrew association and line 
and training staff synthesized and adapted the 
consultants' recommendations, using observations from 
full mission simulator checks of command trainees. It was 
concluded that the course would be designed to 
complement standard operating procedures (SOPs). Just 
as the SOPs ensured the safety standards of routine 
operations and anticipated emergencies, so the CRM 
would supply tools to support pilots in the management 
of these activities. 
An outline of the Qantas CRM course 
The focus of the course was on aircrew teamwork and 
decision-making. A model of decision-making was 
represented by the mnemonic GRADE (Gather 
information; Review it; Analyze alternatives; Decide; 
Evaluate outcome). Another mnemonic, TORA, 
represented the situational factors affecting decision- 
making. 
Represented as a square figure, the situational factors 
could be represented in the diagram. TORA was derived 
from the initial letters of the four points of a quadrant 
formed from the two dimensions of the expertise of crew 
and the critical nature of the task being undertaken 
(make the decision Together; Offer the decision-making 
process to another team member; Refer to others while 
the captain leads the process; the captain makes the 
decision Alone). The "refern area of TORA was seen as 
the most important aspect. 
Attitude was described in terms of a graphical 
relationship between the effectiveness of an individual's 
input and the forcefulness of that input, showing a low of 
"withdrawn submissiven rising to a peak at "supportive 
assertive," then progressive deterioration to "dominant 
aggressive." 
Leadership was conceptualized in the familiar terms of 
the Blake and Mouton model (concern for people versus 
concern for performance) conveyed in terms of three 
overlapping foci: task, team, and individual (Blake and 
Mouton, 1982). 
The notion of managing upward was clarified by the 
provision of appropriate support to the leader by judging 
the degree of assertiveness required. This language of 
assertiveness was incorporated in the company's 
Operations Policy Manual in the following four ways: 
1. Express personal concern. 
2. Define preferred alternatives. 
3. Ask for an evaluation. 
4. In an emergency use the phrase: "Captain, you must 
listen!" 
The LOFT program 
The CRM course was supported by a LOFT program 
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that met the approval of the Australian Civil Aviation 
Authority as a cyclic, 12-hour trainingflicense renewal 
package. It occurs in four simulator sessions per year as 
part of a three-year program. 
A two-day course was designed to train instructors for 
the LOFT program and to ensure that they consolidated 
the CRM approach. The first day reviewed the CRM 
course, and the second day concentrated on LOFT 
scenario construction, LOFT briefing and debriefing, and 
a recognition of the issues and principles involved. The 
LOFT program was implemented in three B747-400, two 
B767, and two B747-200/300 simulators. 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
Because baseline data were not available, a pre-post 
survey design was not possible. Instead, the following 
four sources were tapped for descriptive and judgmental 
data: 
1. Crew Survey: This was a six-item survey of crew in- 
line operations, with their responses classified according 
to aircraft type (747P44/767) and to rank (Captain, FIO; 
S/O; E/O). The items asked whether, since the 
introduction of CRM training: 
The use of the GRADE process had significantly 
improved decision-making skills in the cockpit; 
The skills taught in CRM training had significantly 
improved crew teamwork; 
The skills taught in CRM training had significantly 
improved leadership; 
Operational decisions were reached by the crew as 
a team; 
Crew members were more inclined to be assertive 
in expressing their operational opinions; 
Senior crew members were more likely to respond 
to the recommended assertive behavior from other crew 
members. 
2. LOFT Survey: This was a 20-item survey of crew 
who had undertaken a specific LOFT scenario. The 
scenario was a night flight from San Francisco to Los 
Angeles in a complicated weather pattern. There are 
operational problems associated with the five airports 
written into the scenario: San Francisco has a crosswind 
problem; Los Angeles has low clouds and poor visibility; 
Las Vegas has a problem with approach aids; Sacramento 
has marginal weather and aid unserviceability, and 
Oakland has a runway problem. None of these airports 
presents any problems under normal conditions and there 
is no reason to suspect that the flight cannot be 
completed routinely. 
At briefing the crew are warned of a security threat 
from Gulf War agitators. At about halfway through the 
flight, a bomb explosion occurs in the aft hold, 
decompressing the aircraft and failing the number one 
hydraulic system of nose and body gear extension and 
inboard trailing edge flaps. 
After completing the forced descent, the crew must 
decide on a course of action. No airport is entirely 
suitable because of various problems: crosswind with 
possible control damage; a night approach to  a runway 
not approved by the company; committing to an airport 
requiring an alternate although the extended gear could 
not be raised, en route safety height problems, and so on. 
There is no unqualified correct solution. Responses were 
classified by aircraft type (744/747P67) and by position of 
respondent (Captain; FIO; F/E). 
The NASAIUniversity of Texas LINE-LOS checklist 
(Butler, 1991) provided the items for the questionnaire, 
with responses made on a seven-point Likert scale. This 
questionnaire, in use with several airlines, assesses eight 
dimensions of behavior (including communications; 
decision making; team building and maintenance; 
workload management; and situational awareness) as well 
as proficiency and overall effectiveness. Questions on the 
following 20 topics were asked: 
Awareness of the LOFT scenario and problem; 
The effect of any awareness on the training value 
of the scenario; 
The extent of the realism; 
The level of difficulty; 
The level of crew performance on the mission; 
The level of personal performance; 
The value of the LOFT session for crew 
co-ordination training; 
The technical training value of the session; 
The extent of applicable learning from the session; 
Team work; 
Extent of talking or arguing; 
Extent of irritation or frustration; 
Extent of positive contributions to the decision; 
-- 
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Table 1 
Survey of crew in-line operations (n = 243) 
(means and standard deviations) 
Scale: 1 = Strongly disagree through 7 = Strongly agree 
ITEM 
1 Improved cockpit decisions 
2 Improved teamwork 
3 Improved leadership 
4 Team decisions 
5 Greater assertiveness 
6 Senior crew more responsive 
Unilateral decisions made by the captain; 
Crew assertiveness about their opinions; 
Crew evaluation of decisions; 
Knowledge and helpfulness of the instructor; 
Value of the debriefing; 
Value of the feedback from the videotaping; 
Value of LOFT, overall, as a training technique. 
3. LOFT Instructor Survey: This was a 12-item survey 
of instructors involved with the LOFT exercise covered 
by the survey above. The responses were categorized 
according to aircraft type (744/747/767). The items 
covered the following aspects of crew performance: 
Use of the GRADE process and each of the six 
stages; 
Team performance on GRADE; 
Choice of diversion; 
Assertiveness of crew in commslnicating preferred 
options; 
The captain's role (in terms of the TORA model); 
The crew's operation as a team in the whole 
process. 
4. CRM Instructor Survey: This was an 11-item survey 
of CRM instructors. The responses were categorized by 
position: simulator instructor; senior check captain; check 
744 
4.82 
(1.42) 
5.04 
(1.32) 
4.24 
(1.36) 
4.61 
(1.47) 
5.41 
(1.37) 
4.71 
(1.24) 
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747 
4.74 
(1.32) 
4.74 
(1.50) 
4.48 
(1.35) 
4.48 
(1.47) 
5.35 
(1.21) 
4.85 
(1.38) 
767 
4.79 
(1.23) 
4.91 
(1.26) 
4.59 
(1.23) 
4.97 
(1.31) 
5.24 
(1.16) 
4.80 
(1.42) 
CAPT 
4.71 
(1.42) 
4.91 
(1.36) 
4.29 
(1.36) 
4.70 
(1.55) 
5.22 
(1.29) 
4.61 
(1.29) 
F/O 
4.77 
(1.24) 
4.98 
(1.22) 
4.58 
(1.27) 
5.00 
(1.14) 
5.47 
(1.17) 
4.94 
(1.35) 
S/O 
5.12 
(1.20) 
4.97 
(1.34) 
4.41 
(1.21) 
4.35 
(1.37) 
5.56 
(1.19) 
4.88 
(1.25) 
VO 
4.29 
(1.53) 
4.53 
(1.66) 
4.29 
(1.49) 
4.18 
(1.38) 
5.12 
(1.17) 
4.65 
(1.50) 
TOTAL 
4.75 
(1.35) 
4.93 
(1.31) 
4.42 
(1.32) 
4.74 
(1.36) 
5.34 
(1.22) 
4.79 
(1.30) 
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captain; check and training captain; promotional training 
captain; or senior check engineer. The items covered the 
following: 
Perceived value of the GRADE model as a 
decision-making tool; 
View of leadership in decision-making; 
Appropriateness of the use of GRADE in 
operational decisions in emergency situations not covered 
by a checklist; 
Need for decision-making training; 
Value of the language of assertiveness in CRM 
training; 
Effect of the REFER process of TORA on the 
leadership of captains; 
The primacy of task over team or individual in 
flight, pre-flight and post-flight; 
Extent of groupthink as an aircrew problem; 
Value of the DARTS checklist at briefing; 
Effect of managing upward on flightdeck harmony; 
The balance of emphasis on CRM in Qantas. 
RESULTS 
It should be noted that in some cases pilots failed to 
indicate their rank and/or aircraft type and hence their 
data were not examined from those perspectives, 
although their data were included in the totals. Given 
recent trends in the reporting of data like ours (see 
Lundeberg, Fox, & Puncochar, 1994), we decided to use 
means and standard deviation to describe our data. 
Crew survey 
Table 1 shows the results of the survey of 243 flight 
crew involved in line operations. Given that the scale 
used a seven-point scale ranging from "Strongly disagree" 
(1) to "Strongly agree" (7), the overall result is on the 
positive side of neutral, but not markedly so. The 
responses bordered toward "slightly agreen for the view 
that the GRADE process had improved cockpit decision 
making; that CRM skills had improved crew teamwork 
and leadership; that operational decisions were being 
reached by the crew as a team; and that senior crew were 
more responsive to the recommended assertive behavior 
from other crew members. 
Stronger agreement (between "slightly agree" and 
"agree") was gained in response to the view that crew 
were more inclined to be assertive in expressing their 
operational decisions. 
ANOVAs conducted on item scores for the three 
types (744, 747, 767) and four rank categories (captain, 
and so on) showed that there were no significant 
differences between aircraft types or crew status. Worth 
noting, however, is that the most subordinate crew 
member (second officer) was most supportive of the 
effects of GRADE on improved decision-making (Item 
1). This result indicates a greater involvement of all team 
members, perhaps to an unprecedented degree. Flight 
engineers, however, provided the least support for 
improved decision-making, their scores being the lowest 
on this item and others. This finding could have been 
due, at least in some part, to their attitudes toward 
change in a context where their redundancy seemed 
imminent. In addition, there are historical (and spatial) 
reasons for engineers perceiving themselves to be out of 
the loop. 
A similar pattern of response can be found in Item 4, 
which stated that operational decisions were reached by 
the crew as a team. The first officer was most in 
agreement, the engineer least in agreement. 
LOFT survey 
The findings are presented in Table 2. For Items 3-20 
a mean of more than 4.0 indicates that the response has 
been positive. Items 11, 12, and 14 require reversal 
because they express a negative view. Given those 
criteria, an overview of the total results shown in Table 
2 supports the view that the LOFT exercise is a valuable 
training technique. The responses show that the exercise 
gained a reasonably high approval rating of 5.45 out of 7 
(Item 3); that the value of the learning exercise was rated 
at a reasonably high 5.30 out of 7 (Item 9); that the 
crews gave themselves a result of 80% (5.63 out of 7, 
Item 5); and that individuals gave themselves an average 
mark of 71% on their performance (Item 6). Again, 
statistical analyses showed no significant differences due 
to aircraft type. 
Narrative additions to the questionnaire indicated the 
enthusiasm of pilots for LOFT as a form of training. 
What many found particularly useful was the opportunity 
to see a situation through to its conclusion, rather than 
having the simulator re-set after an immediate emergency 
had been dealt with. 
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Table 2 
Survey of aircrew after LOFT exercise (n = 163) 
(means and standard deviations) 
Note: Response on a 7-point scale, negative low, positive high, for Items 3-20 
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ITEM 
1 Awareness of scenario and LOFT problem 
2 This reduced training value of LOFT 
3 Realism of the scenario 
4 Difficulty of the scenario 
5 How well did the crew perform on the mission? 
6 How well did you personally perform? 
7 Rating of the LOFT session for crew co-ordinating 
training 
8 Rating of technical training value of this LOFT 
session 
9 How much have you learned to use on the line? 
10 Our crew really worked as a team 
1 1  We spent too much time talking or arguing 
12 Dealing with crew left me irritated and frustrated 
13 All crew made a positive contribution to decisions 
14 Captain made most decisions, not involving 
others 
15 When necessary, crew members asserted 
opinions 
16 Our crew evaluated its decisions 
17 Our LOFT instructor was knowledgeable and 
helpful 
18 The debriefing after LOFT was highly useful for all 
crew 
19 The videotape of the LOFT provided important 
feedback 
20 Overall, LOFT is an extremely useful training 
technique. 
767 
Y N 
51% 49% 
33% 67% 
5.48 (0.73) 
4.68 (0.91) 
5.57 (1.01) 
4.92 (0.91) 
5.86 (0.95) 
5.57 (1.04) 
5.44 (0.94) 
6.11 (0.57) 
1.84 (0.55) 
1.95 (1.43) 
6.30 (0.57) 
2.68 (1.55) 
5.97 (0.55) 
5.30 (1.10) 
6.35 (0.59) 
5.81 (1.00) 
4.44 (1.80) 
6.08 (1.10) 
TOTAL 
Y N 
68% 32% 
31% 69% 
5.45 (0.99) 
4.80 (0.92) 
5.63 (0.98) 
4.97 (0.95) 
5.67 (1 .I 8) 
5.41 (1.22) 
5.30 (1.09) 
5.99 (0.67) 
1.87 (0.89) 
1.67 (1.00) 
6.00 (1.05) 
2.94 (1.64) 
5.82 (0.97) 
5.23 (1.36) 
6.14 (0.77) 
5.66 (1.18) 
4.47 (1.75) 
5.81 (1.00) 
744 
Y N 
56% 45% 
40% 60% 
5.55 (1.10) 
4.80 (0.83) 
5.15 (1.04) 
4.63 (1.01) 
5.80 (0.89) 
5.20 (1.40) 
5.20 (0.77) 
5.84 (0.59) 
1.75 (0.44) 
1.55 (0.60) 
5.95 (1 .05) 
3.20 (1.54) 
5.75 (1.16) 
4.90 (1.65) 
5.90 (0.91) 
5.95 (0.89) 
4.90 (1.59) 
5.90 (1.59) 
747 
Y N 
21% 79% 
31% 69% 
5.56 (0.81) 
4.82 (0.90) 
5.56 (1.00) 
4,85 (0.92) 
5.68 (1 29)  
5.46 (1.28) 
5.39 (1.04) 
5.95 (0.64) 
2.00 (0.91) 
1.68 (0.90) 
5.89 (1 -10) 
2.80 (1.55) 
5.75 (0.74) 
5.23 (1.22) 
6.05 (0.80) 
5.67 (1.23) 
4.62 (1.72) 
5.64 (1 .OO) 
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When LOFT scenarios are being designed it is difficult 
for both the designer and/or the instructor to design one 
that is both realistic and novel. Most participants were 
aware of the LOFT scenario, but the awareness differed 
widely across fleets (compare the 747 and 744 results for 
Item 1). Such a difference could be linked to company 
operations for the various fleets and the extent to which 
the scenario is part of these operations. That more than 
a third of the participants saw the lack of novelty as a 
problem may indicate a need for greater exposition by 
instructors on the inevitability of awareness if scenarios 
are to be as realistic as possible. 
The response was not as predictable on Item 14 (The 
captain made most decisions, not involving others). In 
the previous reversal items (11 and 12), the means were 
in the range of 1.55 to 2.0, with totals of 1.87 and 1.67. 
In Item 14, however, the range was 2.68 to 3.2, with a 
total of 2.94. The upper extreme in the range was the 744 
crew, whose mean rating of 3.2 meant that they were on 
the "slightly disagree" side of "neutral." This is evidence 
that GRADEtTORA were not being implemented in the 
744 two-crew crews as well as they were in the three-crew 
747 or the two-crew 767. The captains who were more 
likely to make more decisions alone were generally the 
older, more senior captains. However, in the absence of 
more detailed knowledge of the individuals involved, it is 
difficult to postulate other bases for these differences. 
LOFT instructor survey 
The results are presented in Table 3. Items 1 and 5 
had a dichotomous response, clearly indicating a 
perception of successful implementation of the GRADE 
process and an observation by instructors of crews 
actually implementing the decision model. Item 8 
indicates the range of selected diversions, the spread 
indicating the robustness of the scenario in that crews 
were able to justify three different choices of alternate. 
For the remaining items, the midpoint of 4 on the 7- 
point scale provides a criterion for interpretation. 
Despite the fact that most instructors perceived (81 of 
the 95, Item 1) that the GRADE process was identifiable 
and that the crew "decided" (89, Item S) ,  the instructors 
were far less positive in their ratings of the ways in which 
the process was employed by the crew as a team. 
Gathering (Item 2 mean = 3.31) and reviewing ( Item 3 
mean = 3.10) were performed better than the analysis of 
the information (Item 4 mean = 2.78), evaluation of that 
information (Item 6 mean = 2.36), and crew performance 
as a team in the decision-making process (Item 7 mean 
= 2.94). Yet the instructors perceived that the crews 
operated as teams (Item 12 mean = 3.80). The data 
suggest that the gathering process was performed better 
than the succeeding stages of the GRADE process, in the 
eyes of the instructors. 
The results of Items 9, 10, and 11 can be linked by 
their consistency. The instructors thought that neither the 
FIO or El0 were assertive in communicating their 
preferred options, and that the captain tended to make 
the decisions alone. 
It is possible, too, that the order of the presentation 
of the questionnaire items-starting with GRADE, then 
dealing with its components-may have induced a 
response set. It may be useful in future studies to reverse 
this sequence. 
CRM instructor survey 
The CRM instructors were far more positive in their 
evaluation of the effectiveness of decisional and 
leaderships functions introduced by the CRM course. 
Modal scores shown in Table 4 can be interpreted by 
means of a midpoint of 4 on the 7-point scale. @ results 
fall above this point, suggesting a response set when one 
considers that Item 4 (Qantas crews did not require any 
training in decision-making); Item 8 (Groupthink is never 
a problem); Item 10 (Managing upward leads to 
disharmony); and Item 11 (There is too much emphasis 
on CRM) could reasonably have been expected to have 
a modal response at least closer to the midpoint, if not 
below it. 
DISCUSSION 
The results raise several questions on evaluation 
methodology, attitudes and change, crew behaviors in 
different aircraft types, the effect of video replay on 
participants' self-evaluation of their performance, 
scenario construction for LOFT, and the consequences of 
a perceived dichotomy between theory and practice. Such 
a dichotomy precludes uniform implementation of CRM 
within an airline and across the industry. As Helmreich 
(1993) has pointed out: "The implementation of CRM 
will not be complete until acceptance of its contents is 
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more uniform among the organizations that use it." 
First, for evaluation of CRM to be optimized, 
base-line data are needed. The critical point for the 
design of evaluation is when an airline decides on its 
rationale for CRM. With the CRM objectives come the 
criteria for its evaluation. From the criteria come the 
sources of evaluative data, and the scheduling of their 
periodic collection by means of observation, surveys, 
i n t e ~ e w s ,  company operating statistics, and so on. The 
same criteria are the bases for the derivation of 
evaluation instruments. The instruments then need to be 
applied in a field trial, as tests of reliability and validity, 
before being applied prior to the initial CRM to establish 
base-line data. 
Formative evaluation, conducted systematically during 
the progress of CRM, can be of value to participants and 
presenters during the course of a CRM program. It can 
help participants to ensure that aspects of high personal 
relevance and significance are incorporated, and it can 
provide vital feedback to presenters. In brief, the 
evaluation of CRM is as critical as the program itself. 
This importance needs to be reflected in both the budget 
and in critical-path planning before the implementation 
of CRM programs. 
Second, CRM programs are essentially concerned with 
improving the quality of crew behavior. This is an 
attempt to change the way human beings behave. It is 
insufficient to simply show people a "bettern way. There 
is a need for sustained impetus in a variety of ways: 
support of management and peers, bulletins, notices, 
recognition by superiors, and so on. 
In their 1986 survey of Qantas captains, consultants 
concluded that 75% of the captains did not include other 
flight crew in operational decision-making. Neither did 
crew members act assertively to support the leader. The 
Cockpit Resource Management Course was introduced 
and, although receiving enthusiastic support from the 
aircrew associations and those who volunteered to help 
compile the course, the majority greeted the introduction 
of CRM training with either indifference or hostility. 
Response to the course itself was positive. The 
participants were supportive and, from all reports, 
enjoyed and actively participated in the course. A survey 
carried out on completion of each course indicated that 
most participants believed the course was very 
professionally compiled and presented. They almost 
unanimously agreed that the concepts were valuable and 
useful. However, when asked whether the CRM course 
would change the way they conducted their day-to-day 
aircraft operations, the answer was a resounding 
"negative!" (Wilkinson, 1991). 
Perhaps one of the implications is that this 
demonstrable gap between concept and practice has to be 
bridged. LOFT training is one means of aiding this 
transition. Others could include brief follow-up refresher 
courses and on-the-job activities. 
Crew behavior in decision-making appeared to vary 
with group size. In dyads (744, 767) captains tended to 
make fewer decisions alone than those in the 747 triads. 
Further, 767 first officers tended to be more assertive 
than 747 first officers. This result supports further 
research of the type described by Clothier (1991) into 
behavioral interactions across various aircraft types. It is 
relevant to note the extension of this line of research into 
cross-cultural perspectives of CRM (Johnston, 1992) in 
which some of the major contextual variables of 
aeronautical decision-making and judgment are provided. 
Third, there is the question of pilots' self-evaluation. 
Are they their own worst critics? Crew rated their 
individual performances lower than the team 
performance. Ideally, this would be the result of 
observation of synergy in action, when the achievement 
of group power applied to problem-resolution was 
graphically evident. To test this hypothesis it would be 
valuable to ensure when video is employed in CRM that 
participants were desensitized to its application, and that 
a degree of detachment could be introduced into 
self-evaluation. Perhaps a coarse rating scale or some 
fairly relaxed group trials at evaluation of, say, the 
instructor on videotape may be a suitable orientation to 
remove the possibility that such results could be gained 
by self-imposition of unnecessarily rigorous standards. 
Fourth, there is the difficulty involved in scenario 
construction for LOFT. On the one hand, 
line-orientation implies the probability of actual 
occurrence in line flying. On the other hand, the scenario 
has to provide the challenge of novelty and quintessential 
decision-making in terms of process and consequence. 
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Table 3 
Survey of instructors of the LOFT exercise (n = 95) 
(means and standard deviations) 
Note: Items 2-12, 7-point scale, extremes indicated i n  brackets 
JAAER, Fall 1994 Page 35 
RESPONSE 
Y-81 N - 1 4  
3.31 (1.52) 
3.10 (1.40) 
2.78 (1.60) 
Y - 8 9  N - 5  
2.36 (1.75) 
2.94 (1.47) 
SF0 - 33 LAX - 23 
OAIC - 3 NGO - 30 
Others - 6 
2.92 (1.45) 
2.67 (1.56) 
3.03 (1.46) 
- - -- 
3.80 (1.12) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
ITEM 
Was GRADE process identiiiable? 
Did crew "Gather Information"? (new - old) 
Did crew "Review the Information"? 
Did crew "Analyse the Alternatives"? 
Did crew "Decide"? 
Did crew "Evaluate"? (not at all -fully) 
Was Grade process performed as a team? 
Which diversion was selected? 
Was FIO assertive in communicating preferred option? (not at all - very) 
Was El0 assertive in communicating preferred option? 
Did the Captain involve others in problem solving? 
- p-~- 
Did the crew operate as a team? (badly - well) 
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Table 4 
Survey of instructors in CRM (n = 79) 
Reconciling these two extremes is further complicated by actual occurrence stimulate such discussion among pilots. 
the fact that the professional pilot is continually Finally, the evaluation of this CRM program 
discussing and updating skills, knowledge, and demonstrated the gap that can often exist between theory 
procedures. Recent research into pilot learning indicates and practice. The gap is one that is usually more likely in 
that successful airline pilots use discussion with their educational rather than training programs. A training 
colleagues as an important source of learning (Moore, program usually has a narrow focus on a well-defined 
1991; Telfer, 1991). Perhaps LOFT scenarios based on task or skill, with a demonstrable application. Education, 
ITEM 
1. The GRADE decision making process is a useful tool in decision making. 
2. A good leader always makes quick and effective decisions by himself. 
3. The GRADE process is appropriate for operational decision in emergency situations 
not covered by a checklist. 
4. Qantas crews did not require any training in decision making. 
5. Teaching the recommended language of assertiveness is an important aspect of CRM 
training. 
6. The encouragement of Captains to operate in the REFER box of the TORA chart leads 
to weak leadership. 
7. Captains should generally concentrate upon the task to be achieved. The TEAM 
and/or INDIVIDUAL are a pre-flight and post-flight consideration. 
8. GROUPTHINK is never a problem amongst Qantas aircrew. 
9. The DARTS checklist is a useful tool at briefing. 
10. MANAGING UPWARDS leads to disharmony on the flight deck. 
11. There is too much emphasis on CRM in Qantas. 
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6.29 
5.67 
5.41 
5.82 
5.92 
5.75 
5.53 
5.76 
4.94 
5.43 
4.85 
RESPONSE 
(0.60) 
(1.24) 
(1.45) 
(1.06) 
(1.33) 
(1.19) 
(1.22) 
(1.26) 
(1.35) 
(1.17) 
(1.64) 
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however, usually deals with reasons for human 
performance, as well as the nature of the activity itself. 
Given the broader focus, it has to incorporate vagaries 
and variables associated with human motivation, self 
concept, norms, attitudes, and values. It cannot be 
dogmatic or sweepingly universal. For those associated 
with the specificity of flight training and professional 
aviation, the lack of prescription can be frustrating. The 
lack of a unitary theory to govern the way people behave, 
in contrast to why wings generate lift, is a matter that 
merits explicit (rather than implicit) inclusion in CRM. 
This discussion may help participants recognize how the 
designers chose to emphasize the aspects included in the 
course, and the constraints under which they operated. 
CONCLUSION 
There are a number of methodological factors to be 
considered if evaluation of CRM is to be valid and 
reliable. Base-line data are vital, and instruments require 
demonstrable reliability derived from rigorous field 
testing. The need for formative and summative evaluation 
is a critical component in the design of CRM programs, 
and requires consideration in the initial stages rather 
than some time after the program has been operating. 
EPILOGUE 
In 1990 a Qantas 747 departed Cairns on a seven and 
a half hour flight to Narita. Near the top of the climb the 
aircraft began to vibrate and control difficulties were 
experienced because, unknown to the crew, part of the 
wing had detached. Over the next hour the crew grappled 
with wrong advice, pressure from schedulers on the 
disposition of the aircraft for s e ~ c i n g ,  and an attempt by 
air traffic control to have another airliner formate on 
them to inspect the damage. 
The aircraft landed safely at a diversion airfield. 
Analysis of the decision showed that both the process 
and result were exemplary. The captain pointed out that 
he had deliberately applied CRM principles that he had 
practiced in LOFT, and regarded his ability to handle the 
in-flight emergency as a direct result of that training. 
That is the ultimate evaluation of CRM.0 
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